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Chapter 9 




“Assertiveness” stems from adjective “assertive” (“expressing one’s opinion in 
a strong and confident manner”), noun “assertion” (“the act of making a strong 
statement or claim”) and verb “assert” (“1. To state firmly. 2. This insist on it... de-
fend one’s rights, opinions etc.”) (Higgleton, Sargeant, & Seaton, 1992, p. 46). In 
a general sense, assertiveness is self-confidence and confidence of what one says, 
decides or does (in various aspects and fields). Sometimes it is associated with the 
ability to express and pursue one’s own needs and decisions, a sense of self-compe-
tence, value, social status, self-respect, naming and expressing one’s own feelings, 
acceptance of criticism and praise, and with a mental attitude and a group of habits 
that affect the way of making decisions and actions in such a way that they are be-
coming more in line with what the entity intends and accepts (Lloyd, 2002; Paris & 
Casey, 1979; Pfeiffer & Pfeiffer, 2003, 2010; Phillips, 2002; Rakos, 1991; Robinson, 
1982; Stoudenmire, 1978; Walmsley, 1991).
Nowadays, the term “assertiveness” has become a fashionable keyword in pop-
ular and scientific literature and it sometimes has been affected by the tendency of 
glorifying such words by narrowing the scope of “assertiveness” to mean only ad-
vantages, positive features determining personal patterns (e.g. Stoudenmire, 1978) 
as opposed to aggression, hatred, contempt, stupidity, etc. (e.g. Alberti & Emmons, 
2001; Walmsley, 1991). This narrowing of the scope is acceptable in definitions reg-
ulating or designing – narrowing the meaning of words or conferring new meaning 
to words. It should be noted, however, that it is not consistent with the meaning of 
“ assertiveness” in ordinary and scientific language, according to which, for exam-
ple, one can be thoughtlessly assertive, assertively express hatred, contempt for peo-
* This paper was originally published in the Jagiellonian Journal of Management in 2016, 2(1).
116 Jan F. Jacko
ple (Lloyd, 2002); assertiveness is a characteristic of actions and attitudes that may 
be rational or irrational (Paris & Casey, 1979; Robinson, 1982).
The purpose of the chapter is not to present a review of theories and concepts of 
assertiveness. The text constitutes an objective analysis. This applies to the relatively 
poorly scientifically examined kind of assertiveness – assertiveness in the transmis-
sion of information (hereinafter referred simply to as “informative assertiveness”) 
and the difference between its rational and irrational kind. The objectives are real-
ized using the phenomenological analysis and the case study.
9.1.  Rational assertion and assertiveness in the 
methodological sense
“Rationality” in the study indicates the feature of actions, i.e. it does not refer to for 
example rationality of knowledge, science, emotions or organizations. It is under-
stood in the methodological sense (Bunge, 1987, p. 5; Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123), i.e. 
it does not refer to factual (economic) rationality of actions (Hey, 1993; Kotarbiński, 
1973, p. 123). Since the phenomenon of methodological rationality builds on ra-
tional assertion, it we first specify its nature.
Term “assertiveness” has a Latin etymology. Latin assero and assertio mean as-
sertion – a confident and forceful statement of fact or belief, that something is such 
and such, for example – recognizing a sentence as true or making a judgement 
with the conviction of its truthfulness. In antiquity, it indicated the recognition of 
a slave to become a free person (Kumaniecki, 1974, p. 53). In contemporary lan-
guages assertion can denote speech acts “in which something is claimed to hold” 
(Pagin, 2014) or a mental act of certainty about the truth of (conviction of truthful-
ness, subjective certainly of truthfulness) beliefs and statements expressing them. 
Assertion can be understood in methodological (as assigning them truthfulness 
or probability because of their justification), emotional (feelings about their truth-
fulness or likeability) or behavioural (willingness to act in accordance with them) 
meanings. Further parts of the study refer to assertion in the methodological sense 
(Bocheński, 1993; Bortolotti, 2010; Bunge, 1987).
Assertion is gradated due to its certainty – it can be stronger or weaker. The 
strength of methodologically rational assertion of statements is proportional to 
its justification. Rational certainty of information (rationality of assertions in the 
methodological sense) lies in the symmetry (compatibility) between justification 
and certainly of beliefs: the better a given claim is justified, the greater the (subjec-
tive) certainty of its truthfulness or probability. The proportion does not take place 
in the irrational assertion (Bortolotti, 2010; Jacko, 2013; Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123; 
Pagin, 2014). For example, assertion accompanying hypotheses is methodological-
ly rational if the entity is aware of the their justification (e.g. that they are probable 
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but have not been proven) and sure of them insofar as they have been justified. It is 
not rational if the entity is certain about them (when they have not been sufficient-
ly proven) (Lakatos, 1980; Matheson, 2011; Popper, 1996, 2002).
Rational assertiveness (in the methodological sense) is the perpetual inclina-
tion (attitude) to rational assertion, and irrational assertiveness (in the method-
ological sense) – to irrational assertion. Rationally assertive persons (manifesting 
a tendency to rational assertion) are certain of their beliefs insofar as they are prop-
erly justified. Rational entities can maintain the beliefs even under pressure and are 
ready and willing to change their views when they prove wrong. The lack of ration-
al assertiveness is a lack of willingness to rational assertion. This lack must be dis-
tinguished from irrational assertiveness, which is the tendency to irrational asser-
tion. Irrationally assertive agents wishfully evaluate their beliefs. They can maintain 
beliefs contrary to their knowledge, deny direct experience, violate the laws of log-
ic, if their knowledge, direct experience, the laws do not lead to where the method-
ologically irrational agents wish (Bortolotti, 2010).
9.2. Informative assertiveness
In the informative aspect, assertion is a quality of speech acts. It is about express-
ing certainty either verbally (e.g. using quantifiers such as “I’m sure,” “I’m not sure,” 
“certainly,” “perhaps,” “probably,” etc.) or non-verbally (e.g. when you confirm your 
own or someone else’s words, nodding, expressing certainty or its lack with intona-
tion, mimicry or gesture). Rational informative assertion of the speech acts consists 
in expressing rational certainly of information. Irrational informative assertion of 
speech acts expresses irrational certainty (Pagin, 2014).
Informative assertion plays an informational function – it informs about the 
likelihood. Irrational informative assertion is a kind of misinformation. For it ex-
presses a certainty, which is not methodologically rational. Therefore, these two 
kinds of assertion can play different roles in interpersonal communication. Ration-
al informative assertion supports communication and understanding. Irrational in-
formative assertion corrupts communication and involves a risk of misunderstand-
ing. It can be instrumentally and objectively rational only when it is an effective tool 
for manipulation.
Rational informative assertiveness is a tendency to rational informative asser-
tion of the speech acts. A person rationally assertive in the informative aspect has 
the ability and inclination to accurately express their methodologically rational cer-
tainty. It can manifest itself, for example, in indicating probability of information. 
Irrational informative assertiveness is a tendency to express informative irration-
al assertion of speech acts, for example, exaggerated expression of confidence (in-
consistent with rational certainty) or the expression of uncertainty of beliefs in the 
light of their valid proof.
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In the following sections one will analyse examples presenting the role of ra-
tional and irrational informative assertiveness in some typical situations of man-
agement and one will argue that rational informative assertiveness is a manageri-
al competence. One will formulate and partially justify the following hypothesises:
– In some situations rational informative assertiveness is a necessary condi-
tion of efficient performance of managerial roles. For both leaders and ordi-
nary employees need the ability to accurately determine the degree of cer-
tainty of their knowledge and to accurate express their certainty.
– In some situations irrational informative assertiveness cause unnecessary 
misunderstandings and conflicts, which contradict the objectives of man-
agement.
9.3. Rational informative assertiveness of experts and advisers
The task of experts and advisers is to suggest good solutions. Their authority does 
not have to be affected when they admit that there is something they are not sure 
about or ask for time to find the answer to the question. The expert does not need 
to know all the answers. He or she should only know where and how to find them 
(Sadler, 2001). Nevertheless, advisers and experts may be tempted to hide their 
doubts under the guise of irrational assertiveness when accompanied by the fear 
that uncertainty can be read as a lack of competence. The fear is risky and inconsist-
ent with their expert and advising roles in the process of management. For exam-
ple, we ask an expert or advisor to resolve the problem and get information about 
one course of action, when in fact, she or he knows several solutions. If the deci-
sion-makers have received information that the expert is not certain of a solution 
and that there are more possible solutions, they could consider other options of ac-
tion, seek information from other sources etc., which would allow for making a bet-
ter decision, and – most importantly – they would be better aware of the risks asso-
ciated with taking this or that decision.
In some cases, information about risk is more important than solutions. Con-
sultants can be employed in organizations not only to identify the best scenario of 
action, but also in order to determine the risk of solutions at stake. Therefore, ra-
tional informative assertion is an important skill of advisers and experts (Frenkel, 
Hommel, & Rudolf, 2004).
Excessive assertiveness of the adviser can be expected by the customer and jus-
tified in part by the function of motivation. This happens, for example, when the 
customers expect that the adviser will motivate them to make decisions or con-
firm the intentions pursued. Even in such a situation advisers are responsible for 
the mistakes of the customer resulting from their overconfidence. Thus, for exam-
ple, theorists of business “couching” point to the fact that the role of the coach, inter 
119Rational informative assertiveness in management communication
alia, is to raise the customer’s concerns and skills to challenge the known and prov-
en solutions so that they can find even better solutions (Garvey, Stokes, & Meggin-
son, 2008; Ives & Cox, 2014).
9.4. Informative assertiveness of a seller
Even if the behaviour of the seller encourages the purchase, it may in some cases 
not be in the interest of the institution in charge of sales for the long term. This can 
happen when it has the hallmarks of an irrational informative assertion, which mis-
leads the buyer. For example, irrational informative assertiveness might be a sales 
tactic involving understatement – an indicator of the benefits of the product and 
concealment of its defects, which can confuse the customer and lead to purchase 
decisions, which would not have been taken if the customer had had adequate 
knowledge. When the customers become the users of the product, they can discov-
er its flaws. Then they may avoid repeat purchases where they were misled. In this 
case the above, assertiveness is not to the advantage of the seller and the organiza-
tion that employs them, because it results in the loss of the company image and out-
flow of customers. It is effective, but in the short term. In the long term it is risky 
and, therefore, inefficient.
There are better ways of selling than the above tactic of understatement. Skills 
of rational informative assertiveness are required to encourage the customer to buy 
without using the above tactic than with its use. For example, one can ask the cus-
tomer about the criteria the product has to meet, and then describe the product ac-
cordingly (indicate what advantages and disadvantages it has regarding these cri-
teria), but skilfully – so that the customers well understand how the product can 
satisfy their needs (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2013, pp. 174–193).
9.5. Informative assertiveness of a negotiator
Irrational informative assertiveness may be an element of bluff and persuasion in ne-
gotiations. As such it can contribute to the success of a negotiator. For example, if the 
negotiator makes the impression that they are impeccable regarding the case they 
consider negotiable, they can provoke the other side of the negotiations to make con-
cessions. Therefore, what above was called irrational informative assertion is a recog-
nized negotiating tactic. Note, however, that this is a risky tactic and – in some cases 
– may be inefficient. It is risky especially in the case of long-term cooperation. When 
the other party realizes that it was misled, then the tactic can spoil the image of the 
negotiators and the organization represented by them and may lead to rupture of ne-
gotiations or hinder the establishment of talks in the future (Carson, 2010; Curry, 
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2008, pp. 150–173). The tactic may be too inefficient when it hinders the achievement 
of a satisfactory compromise. It may turn out to be like that, for example, when one 
of the objectives of the negotiations is to build trust between the parties, or at the fi-
nal stage of negotiations when the strategy of cooperation is determined, when reli-
able mutual information plays a very important role for the development of accurate 
solutions (Bugdol, 2011; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991, pp. 50–55).
In the case of the discussion about the disagreement between the parties to 
the negotiations, methodologically rational informative assertiveness may facilitate 
agreement, as it allows dialogue in the context of justification (substantive nego-
tiations). Accurate determination of reasons and arguments of the presented atti-
tude lets the other side understand them well. Expressing confidence in the things 
that are known to be questionable may cause mistrust, because it is a typical man-
ifestation of dishonesty. When justifying, negotiators can examine and discuss the 
merits of their positions, and in this area find compromise solutions for both sides. 
Irrational informative assertiveness can significantly reduce the possibility of nego-
tiations in the context of justifications and thus increases the risk of unnecessary es-
calation of the conflict between the parties (Ury, 2007, 2011).
9.6. Informative assertiveness in motivating and organizing
The superior’s commands can motivate the subordinates by his or her authority 
within the organization (resulting from the role they play in the organization). Be-
sides this, the superior can motivate them by indicating the reasons of his or her 
decisions. In this case, the subordinate have a chance to submit to the instruction 
not only because it is their duty or fear, but also by recognizing the legitimacy of the 
instruction. Therefore, rational informative assertiveness plays the role of rational 
motivation, when the supervisor motivates the subordinates by their understand-
ing of the reasons of his or her decision (Frey & Osterloh, 2001).
When issuing commands rational informative assertiveness can support effi-
ciency of their execution when they specify their aim and probability of informa-
tion. For example, a supervisor may issue a command to a subordinate in this way: 
“Please buy product X at company Y,” or: “I have just received from source Z the in-
formation that product X has the best price in company Y, so please go there to buy 
it, but I’m not entirely sure of this information, so please check it first.” The practi-
cal difference between the two messages is that the second message carries the in-
formation about the real purpose of the transaction. Its aim is to make a purchase 
at a good price (not make a purchase in company X). Imagine that in the meantime 
the price of product X has increased significantly in company Y and the employee 
becomes aware of it before making a purchase. After receiving the first command – 
they will make a purchase and expose their own organization to unnecessary costs. 
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In the second case, maybe before buying they will consult their supervisor and con-
firm the instruction. Then the employee and supervisor have a better guarantee of 
achieving the purpose (purchase at a good price).
Rational informative assertiveness can be a method of taking orders by subor-
dinates, when it carries information about whether the command has been under-
stood and whether they are able to fulfil it well. Exaggerated (irrational) informa-
tive assertiveness of an employee, even if it is a way to show respect for a colleague 
or superior, can be confusing and result in poor execution of the command. It is 
a fact that fashion for assertiveness sometimes is wrongly associated with over-
ly confident confirmations, for example, in response to questions: “Are you sure?” 
“Do you understand it?” or “Can you do it?” Succumbing to this fashion of speech 
the employee does not make proper use of the opportunity to acquire additional 
instructions that would help them better perform the task or avoid mistakes. If, as 
a result, the command is not executed or not executed well – it can lead to losses 
and conflicts within the organization.
Conclusions
The chapter specifies the difference between rational and irrational informative as-
sertiveness and their nature. It indicates the role of rational informative assertive-
ness and the risk posed by irrational informative assertiveness in management. The 
analyses show some reasons to shape rational informative assertiveness in manag-
ers and other members of organisations.
The study opens some perspectives of further empirical and theoretical research. 
It formulates hypotheses that can be empirically investigated. The hypotheses can be 
specified in various ways and lead to further investigations. For example, one can ex-
perimentally investigate the impact of rational and irrational assertiveness in com-
munication between organisations on the possibility of building stable alliances and 
cooperation between the organisations in specific areas, the impact of rational and ir-
rational informative assertiveness of the members of an organisation on its function-
al and existential security. The distinction between rational and irrational informa-
tive assertiveness can be useful in the analysis of management processes in contexts 
and cases other than those indicated in this study. For example, there takes place 
a wide spread discussion in management ethics on the problem of admissibility of 
manipulation in management. The study outlines some mental mechanisms of and 
risks essentially linked to irrational informative assertiveness. In this way the chap-
ter shows some pragmatic limits of appropriability of manipulation in management. 
These are only examples of empirical and theoretical research perspectives indicat-
ed by the supplementation of management communication theories with the distinc-
tion between rational and irrational assertiveness, which is presented in this chapter.
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